CHAPTER II
The Psychology of the Monty Hall Problem:
Discovering Psychological Mechanisms for Solving a Tenacious Brain Teaser
SUMMARY
The Monty Hall problem (or three door problem) is one of the most famous examples of a "cognitive illusion", often used by psychologists, economists, and even law scientists to demonstrate people's resistant deficiency in dealing with uncertainty. By analyzing this problem's cognitive aspects we discovered synergistic relationships among four elements from the cognitive psychologists' toolbox. These elements are natural frequencies, mental models, perspective change, and the less-is-more effect. Our first step in this chapter is to show that these four elements can serve as building blocks of a comprehensible solution to the problem; yet certain features of the problem's standard version block the intuitive pathway to their use. Secondly, we review ongoing debates on the problem, in particular the one on "missing information". We argue that participants' difficulties in solving the problem are not due to their wrong assumptions that arise from a lack of task information but rather due to a lack of appropriate information representation. Finally, we experimentally manipulate the problem's formulation along the lines of each of the four cognitive elements. These manipulations combined indeed lead to an increase in the proportion of novice participants who respond correctly from the typical range of 5-15% to over 50% (Studies 3, 4) . In a training study (Study 5) we showed that with advance tutoring people's widely cited resistance can be broken and their performance can even be increased up to 82% correct responses.
INTRODUCTION
For 28 years, Monty Hall hosted a game show on American television called "Let's Make a Deal". Contestants on this show were often confronted with a dilemma in which they had to decide whether to stick with an initial choice or switch to an alternative.
What contestants should do in this situation sparked a heated public debate in 1991, after a reader of Parade magazine asked the following question (see vos Savant, 1997) , today known as the Monty Hall problem or the three-door problem:
______________________________________________________________________ "Suppose you're on a game show and you're given the choice of three doors.
Behind one door is a car, behind the others, goats. You pick a door, say number 1, and the host, who knows what's behind the doors, opens another door, say number 3, which has a goat. He then says to you, 'Do you want to switch to door number 2?' Is it to your advantage to switch your choice?" 6 
______________________________________________________________________
In three of her weekly columns, vos Savant 7 attempted to convince readers that switching is to the contestant's advantage. First, she declared: "Yes, you should switch.
The first door has a 1/3 chance of winning, but the second door has a 2/3 chance." Then she explained her statement by asking readers to visualize one million doors: "Suppose there are a million doors, and you pick number 1. Then the host, who knows what's behind the doors and will always avoid the one with the prize, opens them all except door number 777,777. You'd switch to that door pretty fast, wouldn't you?"
Responses to these columns were numerous, passionate, and, in some cases, vitriolic. 8 Many of vos Savant's disbelievers had Ph.D.s and worked in the field of 6 In the following we will refer to this as the standard version of the problem. In the real game show Monty Hall played several variations of this setting. But it is important to note that the discussion about the problem started only after vos Savant's columns appeared in Parade. Readers there were explicitly referred to the version posed by the inquisitive reader, and no mention was made of the real game show. 7 Marilyn vos Savant's column in Parade magazine is called "Ask Marilyn". According to the Guiness book of world records of 1991 she was, at the time of the controversy, said to be the person with the highest IQ in the world (IQ: 228) and readers could ask her whatever they wanted. In 1997 she summarized the exploding discussion about the Monty Hall problem in her book The power of logical thinking. 8 In total, she received 10,000 letters replying to her three columns. For a collection of the most interesting (and the most amusing) ones, see vos Savant (1997) . Health! Of the letters from the general public, 92% are against our answer, and of the letters from universities, 65% are against our answer [...] . But math answers aren't determined by votes" (vos Savant, 1997, p. 10) . From reading vos Savant's (1997) recollection, it becomes clear that it is not only difficult to find the correct solution to the problem, but it is even more difficult to make people accept its solution.
PREVIOUS RESEARCH
This seemingly simple problem has since drawn the attention of several authors, for instance, in American Statistician and Skeptical Inquirer (e.g., Frazier, 1992; Posner, 1991) . The New York Times also reported on the debate in a front-page story (Tierney, 1991) . These discussions have verified vos Savant's conclusion that the mathematically correct solution for the benefit of the contestant is to switch, if the rules of the game show are so: Monty Hall has in any case to reveal a goat after the contestant's first choice and he cannot open the door chosen by the contestant.
9
In von Randow's book about the Monty Hall problem (1993), the German science journalist described how he shifted his interest from mathematical to psychological issues after he realized that switching is indeed better. He raised the following three questions (p. 9): Why were so many people, even those who were 9 For a detailed discussion on ambiguity of the wording of the Monty Hall problem see section "Are There Possible Effects of Incomplete Information?" in this chapter.
highly educated, deceived? Why are so many of them still convinced of the wrong answer? Why are they so enraged?
Similarly, Piattelli-Palmarini remarked (see vos Savant, 1997, p. 15 How mistakes of reason rule our minds (1994), Piattelli-Palmarini singled out the Monty Hall problem as the most expressive example of the "cognitive illusions" or "mental tunnels" in which "even the finest and best-trained minds get trapped" (p. 161).
Experimental psychologists have used the Monty Hall problem to study various psychological aspects of human probabilistic reasoning and decision making. 10 In fact, before the Monty Hall problem became famous, Shimojo and Ichikawa (1989) investigated a problem that is mathematically very similar, namely, the problem of three prisoners. 11 Shimojo and Ichikawa examined the beliefs of participants experimentally, whereas Falk (1992), for instance, looked at the same issue theoretically. The main aim of both lines of work was to provide explanations for people's reasoning errors with this kind of problem. Granberg and Brown (1995) later conducted the first comprehensive experimental study of the Monty Hall problem. They presented participants with the 10 Generally there are two kinds of possible experiments related to the Monty Hall problem. First, one can ask participants for a (justified) decision, when they are provided with a written version. Second, one can let people play the game repeatedly with feedback (e.g., against a computer) and can investigate how they change their behavior by observing the outcome. In this chapter we will only focus on experiments of the first kind. For experiments of the second kind see, for instance, Friedman (1998) or Granberg and Dorr (1998) . 11 The problem of three prisoners is the following: Tom, Dick, and Harry are awaiting execution while imprisoned in separate cells in some remote country. The monarch of that country arbitrarily decides to pardon one of the three, but the name of the lucky one is not immediately announced, and the warden is forbidden to inform any of the prisoners of his fate. Dick argues that he already knows that at least one of Tom and Harry must be executed, thus convincing the compassionate warden that by naming one of them he will not be violating his instructions. 
PRESENT APPROACH AND OBJECTIVES
Most of the research on the Monty Hall problem has focused on beliefs that might lead to the mathematically incorrect choice. We are instead interested in the mental processes that lead to correct reasoning. Knowledge of these cognitive mechanisms should allow us to formulate a version of the Monty Hall problem better adapted to human cognition than the standard version.
Despite the difficulties people have with the Monty Hall problem, there are people who do find the correct solution intuitively. The natural questions are: Which reasoning processes are employed by these few successful problem solvers? And: Given we find these mechanisms, how can we develop appropriate ways to represent and to explain the brain-teaser to eliminate the typical resistance? In the brain-storming phase preceding the experiments we confronted colleagues and students with the problem and later discussed their intuitions with them. This led us to the insight that the reasoning Table 2 .1 below). We will later demonstrate why ignoring Monty Hall's behavior in arrangement 3 turns out to be a crucial building block of an intuitive solution.
By performing a "mental simulation" of the three possible arrangements (i.e., considering the whole sequence of actions specified by each arrangement in Figure   2 .1), one can see that in two out of three possible arrangements the contestant would win the car by switching (namely in arrangements 1 and 2). Let us identify some inter-related features in Figure 2 .1 and express them in terms of psychological elements:
1. Rather than reasoning with probabilities one has to count and compare frequencies.
2. These frequencies correspond to possible arrangements of goats and cars behind the doors. One has to compare the number of arrangements in which the contestant would win the car by switching to the number in which she would win by staying.
3. One has to consider the possible arrangements as they would appear from behind the doors. The rows correspond to the mental models, each of which represents a possible situation of the Monty Hall problem, given the contestant first chooses door , Gigerenzer & Hug, 1992; Wang, 1996; Fiedler, Brinkmann, Betsch, & Wild, 2000) .
With respect to the Monty Hall problem we suggest the following theoretical connection between a perspective change and the structure of Bayes' rule: Assuming that the contestant first chooses door 1 and that Monty then opens door 3 (the standard version), the probability that the car is behind door 2 can be expressed in terms of Bayes' rule in the following way: 
LESS-IS-MORE EFFECT
A common question encountered by both a user and a provider of information is what is the best amount of information that should be used or provided? Goldstein and Gigerenzer (1999) reported empirical evidence that sometimes "knowing less is more".
A clear example provided by the authors is the use of the recognition heuristic, which exploits the potential of recognition to help people make inferences. When a situation requires inferring which of two objects has a higher value on some criterion (e.g., which
is faster, higher, stronger), the recognition heuristic is simply stated: If one of the two objects is recognized and the other is not, then infer that the recognized object has a higher value. One of the surprising findings of the authors was that Germans were better than Americans at judging which of two cities in the United States (e.g., San Diego and San Antonio) had the larger population. Why? The German participants, many of whom did not know of San Antonio, could use the recognition heuristic (e.g., infer that San Diego has a larger population than San Antonio because they recognized the former but not the latter). The recognition heuristic is not only frugal in its use of information: It actually requires a lack of knowledge to work. This research finding shows that under certain conditions, a counterintuitive less-is-more effect appears, in which a lack of knowledge is actually beneficial for inference. 
ONE-DOOR SCENARIOS
If the contestant's first choice is specified (one-door scenario), then only three arrangements remain possible. If, for instance, the wording is such that the contestant chooses door 1, then only arrangements A1, A2, and A3 remain (see left column in Figure 2 .2). By switching, the contestant would win in two of the three arrangements (A2 and A3) and lose in only one arrangement (A1).
A second type of one-door scenario that may lead to a similar path of intuitive thinking would entail specifying the location of the car. The arrangements then can be illustrated using any row in Figure 2 .2. For example, the first row would represent the three possible first choices by a contestant when the car is specified to be behind door 3.
One can see that the contestant would win in two of three arrangements by switching (A3 and B3), and in only one arrangement by staying (C3). Thus, whether the door specified is the contestant's first choice or the car position, one-door scenarios allow one to use just one column or one row in Figure 2 .2 to gain insight into the correct solution.
In a nutshell, both no-door and one-door scenarios allow unrestricted mental In a one-door scenario, Monty Hall's behavior either is determined (A3, A2) or irrelevant for the decision (A1). The problem becomes cumbersome, however, when the door opened by Monty Hall now is specified in addition to the contestant's first choice, as it is the case in two-door scenarios.
TWO-DOOR SCENARIOS
The additional specification of the door opened by Monty Hall in the standard version of the problem leaves only two of the three arrangements in the left column in Figure   2 .2 (A1 and A2). A3 is impossible because Monty Hall cannot open the door concealing the car. As a result, one cannot simply count and compare the frequencies of winning,
given that the contestant switches or stays, but rather one has to reason in probability terms to reach the Bayesian solution. That is, Monty Hall's opening door 3 has a lower probability in A1 than in A2, because in A1 he could have opened either door 2 or door reflects Monty Hall's strategy.
We now consider three different strategies that he might use concerning arrangement A1:
First, if one assumes that Monty Hall's strategy is to choose randomly when he has a choice, then the probability of his opening door 3, p(M 3 | C 1 ), equals 1/2. The probability of the contestant's winning by switching (to door 2) can now be expressed in terms of Bayes' rule:
Thus, assuming Monty Hall uses this random strategy, the probability of the contestant winning by switching is indeed equal to what it is in the no-door and onedoor scenarios, namely, 2/3.
Second, if one assumes that Monty Hall's strategy is "to open door 3 whenever possible", then p(M 3 | C 1 ) equals 1, and the probability of the contestant winning by switching changes to 1/2:
Third, if one assumes that Monty Hall's strategy is to open door 2 whenever possible, then p(M 3 | C 1 ) is 0, and the probability of the contestant winning by switching would become 1: show (2) nor to the a priori probability distribution of car and goats (3) (c.f., Nickerson, 1996; von Randow, 1993; Mueser & Granberg, 1999) .
(1) The standard version provides no information about Monty Hall's strategy.
Is the problem therefore mathematically underspecified and insoluble? The answer is no, because the standard version does not ask for a probability, but only for a decision.
The general Bayes' rule for the standard version of the Monty Hall problem in the absence of information about Monty Hall's strategy is:
where p(M 3 | C 1 ) is a "strategy" parameter that can vary between 0 and 1.
Since the strategy-dependent probability p(M 3 | C 1 ) varies between 0 and 1, the conditional probability p(C 2 | M 3 ) can vary only between 1/2 and 1 (see Equation 2.5).
Therefore, whatever strategy one assumes Monty Hall uses, the conclusion is that the contestant should switch. Friedman (1998) . 15 Interestingly with regard to this aspect the Monty Hall problem differs from the problem of three prisoners. In the problem of three prisoners the rule automatically is specified by Dick asking for the name of another prisoner who will be executed. In the Monty Hall problem the corresponding specification would be that the contestant explicitly asks Monty Hall to open a door with a goat after his first choice.
wonder whether the car was randomly placed behind one of the three doors. In other words, is the assumption of an equal a priori distribution p(C 1 ) = p(C 2 ) = p(C 3 ) = 1 3 justified? Perhaps the car is more likely to be placed behind door 1 because it is closest to the entrance of the stage.
A formulation of the Monty Hall problem providing all of this missing information and avoiding possible ambiguities of the expression "say number 3" would look like this (mathematically explicit version):
Suppose you're on a game show and you're given the choice of three doors.
Behind one door is a car, behind the others, goats. The car and the goats were In short, people seem to struggle not with the ambiguity of the standard version's assumptions but with the mathematical structure of the scenario. 16 As we will see in the next section, what blocks correct intuitive reasoning is not lack of information, but lack of the right information representation.
INTUITIVE VERSIONS OF THE MONTY HALL PROBLEM
To formulate wordings of the Monty Hall problem that should elicit the correct solution we take into consideration the four psychological elements discussed earlier as well as the discussion on missing information. The four psychological elements were: 17 (1) perspective change, (2) the less-is-more effect, (3) mental models, and (4) natural frequencies. We incorporated these elements via the following manipulations:
16 Ichikawa and Takeychi (1990) found that the same is true for the related problem of three prisoners. 17 The new order 1-4 now follows the order of appearance in the manipulated wording.
1. We manipulated perspective by asking participants to "imagine you are the host of this game show" instead of assigning them the role of the contestant.
2. We used a one-door scenario (this means not specifying the number of the door opened by Monty Hall). Relative to the two-door scenario in the standard version, this can be considered an incorporation of a less-ismore effect. The beneficial lack of information about the door opened by Monty Hall would allow participants to reason in terms of frequencies (e.g., Figure 2 .1) instead of probabilities.
3. We explicitly mentioned the three possible arrangements of goats and car behind the doors to participants to prime the relevant mental models (i.e., A1, A2, and A3; see Figure 2 .2).
4. We asked participants to tell us the frequencies with which the contestant would win by switching and by staying: and -as we have seen -considering just two arrangements can never lead to an intuitive correct solution, regardless of whether the right perspective or an intuitive frequency question is provided. Therefore, we consider the less-is-more manipulation a "basic" manipulation that is required before implementing the others. This and other dependencies among the manipulations will be analyzed in detail in the sum-up section.
relevant versions. All versions had similar layouts (see Figures 2.3, 2.4). Our prediction
was that the more manipulations are incorporated in the wording of the Monty Hall problem, the better the performance of participants becomes. Furthermore, we expected that when all manipulations are incorporated (we call such a version a full intuitive version), the mathematical structure will become accessible to humans' reasoning and participants' performance will no longer support the claim that the Monty Hall problem is an insurmountable cognitive illusion.
As the control version (Figure 2.3 
Task:
Imagine you are the contestant and you do not know which door the car is behind.
You now randomly choose a door, say number 1.
door 1 door 2 door 3
H OS T C ON TES TAN T (You)
Afterwards Monty Hall opens door 3 according to the rules of the game, and shows you a goat. Now he asks you whether you want to stay with your first choice (door 1) or to switch to door 2. Note that in addition to the standard version our control version contained the following features: We added the rule of the game show to give total clarification of the intended scenario and to guarantee comparability with other studies. Furthermore, to reduce variance in participants' assumptions, we eliminated the word "say" when specifying the door opened by Monty Hall. 19 To describe the scenario more vividly we added a diagram of the three doors. Finally, because we were not only interested in participants' actual decisions but also in how many "switchers" have genuine mathematical insight into the problem, we asked participants for justifications of their After Monty Hall shows a goat to the contestant, he asks the contestant to decide whether s/he wants to stay with the first choice or to switch to the last remaining door.
Task:
Imagine you are Monty Hall, the host of this game show, and you know behind which door the car is.
The contestant chooses a door, say number 1. To examine the impact of incorporating certain combinations of the four manipulations on participants' performance, we conducted two studies, one in Germany (Study 3) and one in the United States (Study 4).
STUDY 3

Method
In this study, we had three groups of participants (Groups 1-3) . We compared the control version (Group 1; see Figure 2 .3 for English translation) with the full intuitive version of the Monty Hall problem (Group 3; see Figure 2 .4 for English translation). We also tested a version in which only the less-is-more manipulation was incorporated 20 (Group 2). After excluding participants who had already heard of the Monty Hall problem we had 135 students (47 men and 88 women) whose average age was 24.7 years. Participants were students of different disciplines and were recruited from various universities in Berlin. They were tested at the Max Planck Institute for Human Development in small groups of up to five people. Each participant received only one version of the Monty Hall problem: In Group 1 (control group) we had 67 participants; in Groups 2 and 3 we had 34 participants each. After the experiment, every participant received a payment of 10 DM (approximately U.S. $5).
Results of Study 3
The results of Study 3 are summarized in Also in studies using simulation of multiple trials remarkable performance after several rounds of feedback was reached (Granberg & Brown, 1995; Friedman, 1998) .
However, in these repeated game settings, participants' insight into the mathematical structure of the Monty Hall problem is not a given: From the first rounds participants can realize through feedback that switching pays -yet, they do not necessarily know why. Our approach -in contrast -is to increase performance and insight in the notorious original problem -neither by changing the number of doors nor by changing the number of rounds.
In Table 2 .2, as in the following tables displaying empirical results, the mental model and the frequency manipulations are combined. The reason for this is that both elements are theoretically and practically connected to each other: On the one hand, the frequency question alone automatically evokes building mental models, because these are the instances to be counted and compared. On the other hand, building mental models can be only half of the process that leads to a problem's solution. The correct answer can only be reached if the mental models are then counted and compared with respect to their outcomes. In the following we will refer to this combined manipulation as "frequency simulation". We choose the word "simulation" instead of "model" because in Figure 2 .1 just building the three "models" is not enough. Each model first has to be "simulated" (i.e., considering the whole sequence of actions specified by the model) until the outcome becomes apparent. As we know, such a cognitive procedure within a model is not intended in Johnson-Laird's notion of mental models. Group 5: A one-door scenario in which the first choice is specified ("less-is-more" manipulation). The participants were asked to take the contestant's perspective and make the stay-switch choice after answering the frequency question ("frequency simulation").
Group 6: A one-door scenario ("less-is-more" manipulation) in which the car position is specified. The participants were asked to take Monty Hall's perspective ("perspective change") and make the stay-switch choice without first having answered the frequency question.
Group 7:
A one-door scenario ("less-is-more manipulation") in which the car position is specified. The participants were asked to take Monty Hall's perspective ("perspective change") and make the stay-switch choice after answering the frequency question ("frequency simulation"). Since all four manipulations are incorporated this is -besides the version of conditions where the car position is specified (groups 6 and 7) no meaningful version from the perspective of the contestant can be formulated -regardless of whether the frequency simulation is implemented or not: Revealing participants in such a one-door scenario the car position (e.g., "the car is behind door 1") would provoke the following answer: As a contestant, I would choose door 1, and then I would stay with this choice.
Results of Study 4
The results of Study 4 are presented in Table 2 
COMPARISON OF STUDIES 3 AND 4
The similar performance of the two identical control versions (Groups 1 and 4)
suggests that it would be reasonable to look at the results collapsed between studies. Let us consider participants' performance in all seven groups simultaneously ( Figure 2 .5
For a more detailed analysis of participants' performance we furthermore classified the "switch choices" of all seven groups into the following categories:
-Participants who gave correct solutions and exhibited full insight into the mathematical structure -Participants who had the right intuition but could not provide a mathematically correct proof -Participants who switched randomly, meaning that switching and staying are equally good
To summarize: The category "switched with mathematical insight" remained the same, whereas the other switchers were classified according to their "degree of insight". All participants' protocols could easily be classified within this scheme.
Interestingly the "stay choices" did not require a similar categorization: None of these participants had the feeling that staying might be better from a mathematical point of view. manipulations. In groups 3 and 7 the better performance in terms of really grasping the mathematical structure of the task clearly can be attributed to the four psychological manipulations. The similar performance of groups 3 and 7 -as well as analyzing participants' protocols -suggest that the kind of one-door scenario (specifying first choice vs. specifying car position) makes no remarkable difference. The synergistic effect of the combination of the perspective change and the frequency simulation is particularly intriguing. The perspective change alone (Group 5) and the frequency simulation alone (Group 6) both failed to facilitate understanding: The percentage of mathematically correct justifications in Group 5 and Group 6 were not significantly different from that in Group 2, where just the one-door scenario was given. Thus the good performance of participants in the full intuitive versions cannot be attributed to the seemingly powerful frequency question alone. In fact there seems to be a synergistic effect between the frequency simulation and the perspective change since both manipulations have to be applied simultaneously. From the trichotomous categorization (Figure 2 .5) it can also be seen that the counter-intuitively better performance in Group 2 compared to groups 5 and 6 is in fact due to a relatively high proportion of participants who had no insight but switched by following the uniformity belief (empty bars).
Let us finally consider the impact of our "additional changes". Our control version was a modification of the standard version: We specified the rule of the game, we used a diagram of the three doors, we deleted the ambiguous word "say" when specifying the door Monty Hall opens, and we asked for justification of the choice.
These changes alone indeed did increase the proportion of switch decisions somewhat, compared to the standard version, namely from the usual 10-15% up to about 22%.
However, the percentage of participants who gained insight into the problem's structure only because of these non-experimental changes in both control versions was neglegable.
STUDY 5
From Piattelli-Palmarini we learned that even Nobel physicists insist on the wrong answer to the Monty Hall problem and are ready to berate in print those who propose the right answer (quoted in vos Savant, 1997, p. 15 ). People's resistance to the correct solution has been widely cited; even Marilyn vos Savant repeatedly failed in explaining the teaser to her readers (vos Savant, 1997) . Thus, the questions of Study 5 are pedagogical ones: Is it possible to get insight into the mathematical structure of the problem across to the problem solvers? What kind of complete demonstration of the entire solution might help here? In Study 5 we investigated this question by checking whether people were able to apply different explanations to other, similar problems.
Method
We divided participants of Study 3 (German study) -independent of the previous divisions into groups 1-3 -randomly into three new groups. After they had finished solving the Monty Hall problem -successfully or not -they were asked to continue the session for an extra payment. The interested participants got one of three different explanations on how to solve the Monty Hall problem (all three explanations are shown in Appendix II.2). All explanations were based on demonstrations of the correct solution explicated above: The first explanation was based on Figure 2 .1, the second on Table 2 .1, and the third on Equation 2.1.
1. Figure 2 .1 Frequency simulation of the three arrangements, shortened to "FS" 2. Table 2 .1 Six mental models by Johnson-Laird et al. (1999) , shortened to "6MM" 3. Equation 2.1 Bayes' rule, shortened to "BR" Table 2 .5: Different explanations of the Monty Hall problem given to participants after Study 3 According to Table 2 .5, we provided participants with written two-page explanations that we call "FS" (Frequency Simulation Explanation), "6MM" (Six Mental Models Explanation), and "BR" (Bayes' Rule Explanation). To investigate the benefit that participants can take out of each of these explanations we provided them with four new problems. These problems were closely related to the original Monty our knowledge, empirically testing explanations of the Monty Hall problem is virgin soil in this type of research.
After completing their work on the original problem participants received the two-page explanation and had plenty of time to read it. 22 Once they said that they had understood it they were provided with problem A (for the wording see Appendix II.3).
Problem A was the so-called "Russian roulette dilemma" which is identical to the Monty Hall problem except that now there are two cars and one goat behind the doors. We offered all participants of Study 3 the opportunity to participate in Study 5.
Yet, to extract the pure impact of the different explanations we had to exclude all participants who had already solved the original problem with full mathematical insight, because these presumably would profit from their insight into the original problem. In Study 3 we had 145 participants with wrong -or at least not correctly justifiedsolutions. Of these 145 participants 95 volunteered to continue the session for an extrapayment and worked on problem A. When 10 weeks later the same participants were asked to come again for the second measurement date, 68 participants, who were not told that they would be tested again with tasks related to the Monty Hall problem, appeared and worked on problems B, C, and D. Luckily, the distribution of students across explanations still roughly was an equal distribution: Ten weeks after Study 3, 22 participants of the "FS" condition, 25 of the "BR" condition, and 21 of the "6MM" condition showed up again. 22 Because mathematical formulas are difficult to remember we gave Bayes' rule an advantage: Whereas participants with explanation "BR" could make use of their written two-page explanation when solving problems A, B, C, and D, participants receiving explanations "FS" and "6MM" had to give their explanation sheet back after studying it. When solving problems A, B, C, and D they had no access to the explanation sheet but had to rely on their memory exclusively. 23 Here instead of a goat, the host has to reveal a car after the contestant's first choice. Because the contestant is not allowed to choose the opened door, in the Russian roulette dilemma she should stay. Since most participants in this problem would do this intuitively anyhow, the problem here is not to find the right decision but exclusively the mathematical justification.
Results
The results of Study 5 are displayed in Figure 2 .6. Correct solutions across problems 64% 44% 29% Table 2 .6: Participants' performance (correct solutions) on problems B, C and D -10 weeks after Study 3
Interestingly, it seems to be more difficult for participants, when the mathematical structure is identical to the explained problem but the content is changed (Problem D: problem of three prisoners; 35% correct solutions across all explanations) than when the content stays identical but the mathematical structure is extended (Problems B and C: extended Monty Hall problems; 54% and 48% correct solutions across all explanations).
Remarkably, in the "BR" condition almost half of participants could make use of Bayes' rule -even 10 weeks later (note that in problems B and C they had to extend the denominator of Equation 2.1 from three to four summands). Yet, it has to be taken into account that, in the session 10 weeks later, the "BR" explanation sheet had again been distributed (see footnote 14). We speculate that the need to construct Bayes' rule from memory after 10 weeks would drop the performance down to close to 0%. The reason why "FS" participants -and even "BR" participants -outperformed "6MM" participants can be found by looking at protocols: Specifying Monty Hall's behavior entails the need to artificially double the mental models (see Table 2 .1). Trying to perform this doubling -already considered problematic by Johnson-Laird et al. (1999) -seemed to be the stumbling block for participants' reasoning in problems A, B, C, and D. Furthermore, we assume that the manner of displaying the 6 mental models -which we accurately adopted from Johnson-Laird et al. (1999) -is not the most advantageous one. Possibly, their 6 mental models would work better if presented like our 3 arrangements (using arrows etc.).
To conclude, inducing in participants a mental simulation according to Figure   2 .1 -either through the problem's formulation (full intuitive versions of studies 3 and 4) or through an explanation ("FS" explanation of Study 5) -seems to be a powerful means of fostering insight into the structure of the notorious Monty Hall problem -as well as into related problems.
SUM UP
We now recapitulate and consider the relevance of the crucial findings in this chapter.
Frequency question and mental models
In our tables presenting the results of studies 3 and 4 (Tables 2.2, 2.3, and 2.4) the two theoretical elements, mental model and natural frequencies were collapsed into the frequency question for mental models, or shortened, the "frequency simulation". -Laird et al. (1999) claimed that the mental model concept provides another theory of probabilistic reasoning that is different from the natural frequency approach (see Gigerenzer & Hoffrage, 1995) . It is true that both elements stress different aspects of knowledge representation: On the one hand, the term natural frequencies emphasizes external information representation. In nature we observe frequencies of outcomes instead of probabilities and our minds are adapted to this kind of information. Thus the natural frequency approach provides an ecological explanation for why humans are good at dealing with frequencies. On the other hand, the term mental models stresses internal information representation. Yet, when considering the actual reasoning process natural frequencies and mental models are deeply intertwined: The frequency question ("in how many of these three possible arrangements ...") is answered by counting arrangements, which actually are mental models. This intertwinement is not restricted to the Monty Hall problem. Both the natural frequency approach proposed by Gigerenzer and Hoffrage (1995) and Johnson-Laird et al.'s (1999) numerical mental model approach make use of mental models as frequency assessments. Therefore -with respect to probabilistic thinking -mental models are not an alternative to the natural frequency approach, but rather a redescription of the same underlying cognitive process.
Johnson
However, in the Monty Hall problem just considering and counting mental models is not sufficient: Only the mental simulation of these models (i.e., considering the whole sequence of actions specified by the model) leads to their outcomes, which then can be counted and transferred into a frequency answer.
Perspective change and Bayes' rule
Taking Interestingly, the idea of perspective change in Bayesian reasoning is not restricted to agents' perspectives. Consider, for instance, another well-known probabilistic puzzle, the "Three cards problem":
"Three cards are in a hat. One is black on both sides (the black-black card). One is white on both sides (the white-white card). One is black on one side and white on the other side (the black-white card). A card is randomly drawn such that one can only see one side. The side is black. What is the probability that it is the black-black card?" Bar-Hillel and Falk (1982) reported that only 7% of their participants found the correct solution. In terms of Bayes' rule the correct solution is:
where BC: Card is the black-black card, BS: A black side can be seen Thus, instead of asking "What is the probability that it is the black-black card?", the perspective change could be implemented by asking: "What is the probability that the other side is also black?" Of course, this probability question now in addition can be turned into a frequentistic one: "How many of the possible black sides are black also on the other side?"
Implementing the perspective change and the frequency question along these lines into the "Three card problem" and testing the resulting version informally with psychology students of a seminar (N = 30) led to 43% correct responses.
The less-is-more manipulation
Deleting useless information can facilitate reasoning performance for various reasons.
Consider, for instance, the famous Linda problem:
Linda is 31 years old, single, outspoken and very bright. She majored in philosophy. As a student, she was deeply concerned with issues of discrimination and social justice, and also participated in anti-nuclear demonstrations.
Which probability has a higher value?
(a) Linda is a bank teller (b) Linda is a bank teller and is active in the feminist movement
The "conjunction fallacy" -which is assigning (b) a higher probability than (a) -disappears if we simply ask the question without the prefixed description. Whether the grasp of the conjunction rule in principle is a genuine human skill or not, this ability can be misguided by distracting information.
In the Monty Hall problem assuming -for whatever reason -that Monty Hall actually opened door 3 prevents the construction of a mental model in which the car is behind door 3. Only if this "door information" does not interfere with the problem solving process, participants can adopt the intuitive path of reasoning according to The cognitive variability in the three examples -the recognition heuristic (inferring that San Diego is larger than San Antonio merely from never having heard of San Antonio), the Linda problem, and the Monty Hall problem -shows the widespread validity of "less-is-more" effects.
Synergistic effects of manipulations
Among the manipulations we introduced there exist various dependencies, either mathematical or psychological. Why is the less-is-more manipulation a "basic" manipulation? The frequency simulation (frequency question for mental models)
requires the less-is-more manipulation, because only in a one-door scenario can the frequency counting be applied to the relevant mental models: Not implementing the less-is-more manipulation would lead to the uniformity belief, since participants would be limited to two possible arrangements. The perspective change requires the previous incorporation of the less-is-more manipulation for the following reason: Simulating Monty Hall's behavior concerning the relevant arrangements becomes impossible when this behavior is already specified. In a two-door scenario the door opened by Monty
Hall is given to the problem solver. Thus she can no longer exploit the perspective change by simulating the opening of different doors in the different arrangements.
Consequently, we consider the less-is-more incorporation as a prerequisite manipulation for incorporating the remaining three psychological elements natural frequencies, mental models, and perspective change into the wording of the Monty Hall problem.
In addition to the less-is-more manipulation either the frequency simulation (see Group 5) or the perspective change (see Group 6) can be incorporated. Yet, neither of these single implementations leads to a remarkable improvement in terms of understanding compared to the version of Group 2, where only the less-is-more manipulation was incorporated. Only when the frequency simulation and the perspective change are incorporated simultaneously will a large improvement in understanding occur (see groups 3 and 7). Indeed, analyzing participants' protocols reveals that each manipulation needs the other, now for psychological reasons. Not asking for a frequency simulation makes it difficult for the problem solver to grasp the relevant arrangements -even if she perceives the problem from Monty Hall's perspective. On the other hand, when only the frequency simulation is provided, the problem solver cannot "feel" the constraints introduced by the contestant's first choice:
This would require perceiving the arrangements from Monty Hall's perspective. Thus, the seemingly powerful frequency simulation alone is not sufficient to gain insight into the problem's structure. Let us summarize the three important inter-relationships among the four manipulations:
(a) The frequency question asks for mental models. Both elements were combined into one manipulation, namely the frequency simulation.
(b) The frequency simulation and the perspective change need each other to improve participants' performance (psychological dependency).
(c) Both the frequency simulation and the perspective change require the less-is-more manipulation as a pre-condition to express meaningful versions (mathematical dependency).
Does the lack of information on Monty Hall's strategy matter?
Although in the present studies we included the rule in every version of the Monty Hall problem ("Monty Hall has to open one of the unchosen doors, which has a goat"), we did not specify Monty Hall's strategy. As we saw, in one-door scenarios, Monty Hall's strategy does not influence the solution given by Figure 2 .1, whereas in two-door scenarios (our control versions) it might make a difference (see Equations 2.2-2.4). But the protocols revealed that even in our control versions no participant in either study struggled with this problem. 
Uniformity belief
Almost all participants who decided to stay held the uniformity belief. But if they had no reason to favor one option over the other, why then were their choices not evenly distributed between switching and staying? Our analysis of the protocols yielded substantial support for Granberg and Brown's explanation ("participants feel worse if they switch away from a prize than if they stick to an initial choice and miss the prize").
But we also found some instances of another reasoning line. Some participants argued like this: "Why should I change anything if this would not increase my chances of winning?" Although the uniformity belief is mathematically unjustified, from this point of view it seems to be economically rational: Think of a foraging animal that expects the same amount of return from two alternative foraging patches and picks one for the day. It would be perfectly rational to stay in that patch for the whole day rather than to expend extra time and energy to travel to the other patch. The adaptive strategy would be to stick to an initial choice unless a better alternative is available.
We want to indicate that the laws of consistency also tell us not to reverse preferences when options (dis)appear (see, e.g., Gigerenzer, 2001). For example, if one prefers option A over option B, she should not reverse this preference just because a third option C appears (or disappears). What does this mean for the Monty Hall problem? A contestant who first chooses door 1 prefers -for some reasons -door 1 over doors 2 and 3. In the Monty Hall problem deleting one choice option, for instance by opening door 3, brings new information about the unselected door 2, and taking this into account, one should switch. Yet, if this new information is not realized -as with the uniformity belief -deleting door 3 simply means that this option has vanished and now changing the previous preference (i.e., choosing now door 2 instead of door 1)
would be a violation of the laws of consistency.
Granberg and Brown's (1995) "regret explanation", our "economical rationality" approach, and even the laws of consistency can be seen as rational justifications for staying: The uniformity belief in the Monty Hall problem does not and
should not lead to a random choice.
CONCLUSION
A remarkable proportion of naive people can gain full insight into the Monty Hall problem's structure when elements from the cognitive psychologists' toolbox are applied. During the last 10 years the claim has persisted that there is no way to break the resistance of a majority of naive people to grasping its mathematical structure. In fact, all previously tested explanations of the problem (e.g., vos Savant, 1997; Aaron & Spivey, 1998; Johnson-Laird et al., 1999 , tested in the present chapter) displayed no great power of persuasion. It is our claim that our manipulations could have prevented Marilyn vos Savant from receiving thousands of protest letters. Note that our manipulations do not "destroy a fascinating cognitive illusion", but -as we learned from our participants -the Monty Hall problem displays its whole fascination only when one realizes that switching is indeed better.
